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Structure of presentation 
 Background and context of FOFA reforms 
 Scope of best interests duty 
 Assessing likely effectiveness of best interest duty as 
consumer protection measure 
 
 
 
Background and context of FOFA reforms 
 Inquiry in to Financial Products and Services in 
Australia (Ripoll report) following collapse of Storm  
 Failure of  pre-existing law: relied on “efficient market”  
hypothesis; focus on promoting transparency through 
disclosure obligations and PDS rather than quality of 
advice 
 Objectives of new law: Improve quality of financial 
advice to retail consumers; facilitate greater access to 
financial advice 
 Recommended that financial advisers be subject  to 
fiduciary duty 
 
Background and context of FOFA reforms 
 Corporations Agreement 2002: State referral of 
legislative power and enactment of national law for 
regulation of financial products and services:  
Cl 301(1) the Commission will have sole responsibility for the 
general administration of the national law  
 Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian 
Consumer Law 2009:  
Cl 3.1.1 the Commonwealth will enact the text of the ACL;  
Cl 3.1.3 the Commonwealth will enact changes to the investor 
protections of the ASIC Act 2001 and the Corps Act 2001 to 
ensure that they are consistent with the ACL 
Background and context of FOFA reforms 
 ACL: consumer guarantees in relation to the supply 
of goods and services to consumers; statutory duties; 
failure to comply gives rise to statutory causes of 
action 
 Supply of professional services to consumers 
ACL, 60: due care and skill 
ACL, s 61: fitness for purpose or desired result 
 CCA, s 131A(1): ACL (other than Pt 5-5 of Sch 2) does 
not apply to the supply, or possible supply, of 
services that are financial services 
Background and context of FOFA reforms 
ASIC Act amended: 
 New provisions regulating unfair terms and 
unconscionable conduct provisions 
 But no consumer guarantees for financial 
services 
 ASIC Act s 12ED(1): implied warranty of due care  
and skill 
 ASIC Act s 12ED(2): implied warranty of fitness 
for purpose and that desired result will be achieved 
Scope of best interests duty 
 Fiduciary duty not adopted 
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 961B(1) : the 
provider must act in the best interests of the client 
in relation to the advice  
 s 961B(2) : the provider satisfies duty in (1) if 
provider proves provider has done each of the 
following: 
  
 
 
Scope of best interests duty 
  CA, s 961B(2)(a): identified the objectives, financial 
situation and needs of the client (client’s relevant 
circumstances) that were disclosed to the 
provider by the client through instructions 
 Client may not know what objectives, situation and 
needs  of client are 
 Advisers must clarify instructions and exercise 
judgment when client seeks advice about life events 
Scope of best interests duty 
   CA, s 961B(2)(b): identified the subject matter of the 
advice and  the client’s relevant circumstances that 
would be relevant to the advice 
 Scope of the advice will depend on subject matter of the 
advice sought (what the client is seeking advice about); 
 Outcomes client is seeking to achieve; how much client is 
willing to pay; risk profile 
 Advice of different subject matter may be better suited to 
client’s objectives 
 Exercise judgment in deciding scope of advice, based on 
subject matter 
Scope of best interests duty 
CA, s 961B(2)(c): where it was reasonably apparent that 
information relating to client’s relevant circumstances was 
incomplete or inaccurate, made reasonable inquiries 
to obtain complete and accurate information 
 Objective test: CA, s961C:  
    Something is reasonably apparent if it would be apparent to 
a person with a reasonable level of expertise in the subject 
matter of the advice that has been sought by the client, were 
that person exercising care and objectively assessing the 
information given by the provider 
 
 threshold increases if subject matter of advice is highly 
complex and technical  
Scope of best interests duty 
CA, s 961B(2)(d): assessed whether provider has 
expertise required to provide advice sought, and, 
if not declined 
 Consider provider’s professional qualifications and 
training; knowledge and skills in advising about the 
product or strategy being recommended 
Scope of best interests duty 
CA, s 961B(2)(e): If...it would be reasonable, 
conducted a reasonable investigation into the 
financial products that might achieve the client’s 
objectives; and assessed the information gathered 
in the investigation 
 Objective test: not necessary to conduct an 
investigation in all cases; 
 Limit scope of advice according to needs and 
objectives of client; 
 Advisers may be required to give advice beyond 
approved product list 
Scope of best interests duty 
CA, s 961B(2)(f): based all judgments in advising 
the client on the client’s relevant circumstances 
 re-affirms that objectives, situation and needs of 
client  are the paramount consideration 
 May require adviser to provide non-product specific 
advice (debt levels, estate planning, Centrelink 
benefits) 
 
Scope of best interests duty 
CA, s 961B(2)(g): taken any other step that that would 
reasonably be regarded  as being in the client’s best 
interests 
 Objective test CA, s 961E :   
    It would reasonably be regarded as in the best interests 
of the client to take a step, if  a person with a 
reasonable level of expertise in the subject matter of 
the advice that has been sought by the client, exercising 
care and objectively assessing the client’s relevant 
circumstances, would regard it as in the best interests of 
the client, given the client’s relevant circumstances, to 
take that step 
 
 
Scope of best interests duty 
 CA, s 961J: associated duty of priority:  
 requires providers to give priority to their clients’ 
interests where they know, or reasonably ought 
to know, that there is a conflict between the client’s 
interests and the interests of  the provider and 
associated parties 
Scope of best interests duty 
 Best interest duty, not a fiduciary duty 
 Fiduciary duty in Australia is proscriptive (negative 
duties), not prescriptive (positive duties) 
 Fiduciaries must act in clients’ interests, but not 
necessarily their best interests 
 Imposing fiduciary duty would not have achieved 
objective of improving quality and promoting 
confidence 
 Does bests interests duty have a ‘fiduciary character’? 
 RIS: “introducing a fiduciary-like statutory duty to 
act in the best interests of clients, subject to a 
‘reasonable steps’ qualification 
Assessing best interests duty 
Flexibility: Will s 961B (1)improve the quality of 
financial advice? 
 Best interests requires advice providers to take 
positive steps to provide flexible, individualised 
advice to meet each client’s particular needs 
 But CA, s 961B(2): may promote minimum 
compliance: “box ticking mentality”; do the 
minimum to satisfy each step and no more 
Assessing best interests duty 
Flexibility: Will s 961B facilitate greater access to 
advice? 
 One way to facilitate access is to facilitate  provision of 
scaled advice 
 Legislative note to s 961B(2)(g): 
    The matters that must be proved under subsection (2) 
relate to the subject matter of the advice sought by the 
client and the circumstances of the client relevant to that 
subject matter ... That subject matter and the client’s 
relevant circumstances may be broad or narrow, and so 
the subsection anticipates that a client may seek scaled 
advice and that the inquiries made by the provider will 
be tailored to the advice sought.  
 
Certainty for advisers? 
Does s 961B provide certainty for advisers? 
 Term ‘best interests’ is not defined  
 Not clear whether ‘best interests’ will be construed in 
same way as it has in other legislative contexts 
 Not clear whether ‘best interests’ is to be treated as a 
‘fiduciary-like’ duty 
 ‘catch all’ provision CA, s 961B(2)(g) uncertain 
 Not clear how ‘best interests’ duty relates to  
     pre-existing common law protections: duty of care and fiduciary 
duty and  
    ASIC Act, s 12ED implied warranties of due care and skill and 
fitness for purpose and desired result will be achieved 
 
Certainty for consumers? 
 Does s 961B provide certainty for consumers? 
 CA s 961K and s961Q: Financial Services Licensee or 
authorised representative that contravenes s 961B or 
s961J is liable to pay a civil penalty 
 CA s 961M: court can make compensation orders in 
respect of loss or damage for breach of s 961B or 
s961J (on it own initiative; application by ASIC; or 
application by client) 
 Lack of awareness of rights; uncertainty as to scope 
of best interests duty 
 
A proper balance between certainty and flexibility? 
Will benefits or flexibility outweigh costs of uncertainty? 
 Uncertainty will increase compliance costs 
    Costs associated with tailoring advice  
    Costs associated with more professional indemnity 
insurance 
 RIS merely notes that ‘costs will be incurred as firms are 
forced to review practices and update their advice 
models; prescriptive character of best interests duty 
will lead to higher compliance costs’ 
 Higher costs will lead to industry –wide consolidation to 
take advantage of economies of scale; will reduce 
competition; will allow institutions to charge higher 
fees reducing access to advice 
 
A proper balance between certainty and flexibility? 
 Relationship between ASIC Act, Corps Act and ACL 
where financial products (credit) and advice relating to 
goods  being acquired:  
 “a tangled legislative weave”; a labyrinth of statutes”; a 
“legislative morass”; a “legal porridge” 
 Best interests duty another layer of regulation in a 
crowded field 
 Should we  maintain the parallel ASIC Act/ Corps Act  
and ACL regimes ? 
 Should we abandon bests interests duty and make 
financial advisers subject to ACL consumer guarantees? 
